Welfare Reform: Lessons from New England by Francis, Richard M. & Anton, Thomas J.
New England Journal of Public Policy
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 6
9-23-1999
Welfare Reform: Lessons from New England
Richard M. Francis
Brown University
Thomas J. Anton
Brown University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp
Part of the Social Policy Commons, and the Social Welfare Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of
Public Policy by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Francis, Richard M. and Anton, Thomas J. (1999) "Welfare Reform: Lessons from New England," New England Journal of Public Policy:
Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol15/iss1/6
Welfare Reform Lessons from
New England
Richard M. Francis
Thomas J. Anton
This article examines state welfare policy choices following the passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Using data
from national studies and an intensive study of policymaking in New England,
the authors demonstrate that states have acted independently rather than uni-
formly in response to devolution. Because states did not respond as predicted,
and for reasons that were not anticipated, scholars must develop new ap-
proaches to understanding state policymaking. This study argues that account-
ing for state policy choices requires an understanding of the context of
policymaking. Conventional analyses of welfare reform have ignored the insti-
tutional structures through which policy is formulated and thus miss the most
important determinant of choices: the actions of administrative officials. The
lesson of welfare reform in New England is clear: administration matters.
It
is three years since President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act into Law. While it clearly is too early to
attempt definitive conclusions about the significance of that action, it is also clear
that the experiences of the past thirty-six months are beginning to reveal interesting
patterns of behavior as states implement welfare reform. Those patterns are impor-
tant not only because they reveal the scope and direction of state welfare policy but
also because they challenge much of the conventional wisdom about the sources
and quality of state government actions. In this study, we use the experiences of the
six New England states to offer some preliminary observations about the content of
state policymaking in reforming welfare. We also use these experiences to examine
the conventional wisdom developed by social scientists to think about this most
recent effort to reform American welfare policy. We argue that the way we think
about welfare policymaking is as much in need of "reform" as the policy itself.
For those who may think that the experience of only six of the fifty states is too
slender a reed for offering general conclusions of any kind, we suggest a different
view, namely, that these states offer important analytic advantages for understand-
ing emerging patterns of action. The first is diversity: New England includes large
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and small states, rich and poor states, urban and rural states, and states whose re-
form efforts will be shown to range from very restrictive to very liberal. Since our
interest is in identifying potential patterns rather than established patterns, diversity
among these six states is analytically useful. Second, for all its diversity, New En-
gland remains an identifiable region with permeable state borders that should shed
some light on issues such as the extent to which state policymakers are constrained
by the decisions made by other states. Finally, we make liberal use of results begin-
ning to appear from studies with a national focus. Comparing observations of six
states with data available from numerous other states enables us to offer insights
enriched by both regional and national studies.
What New England States Are Doing
We begin with two obvious but often unappreciated points. The first is that the New
England states have been pursuing welfare reform for many years. Enactment of
national welfare reform in August 1996 did not initiate or force reform efforts in
New England, it merely rearranged the structural incentives through which reform
would be pursued. Even if we ignore the well-documented effort by Massachusetts
to reform its welfare system in the 1980s, it remains true that Vermont initiated its
reform in 1991 and that the other states in the region became active in the early
1990s as well. 1 Each state has had to accommodate its programs to the new national
legislation, to be sure, but the federal-state relationship here is accommodation, not
dictation.
The second point is that each of the six New England states has followed its own
independent path in shaping new welfare policies. None of the states has attempted
to impose some model solution on its citizens, and none has attempted to simply
copy proposals adopted by its neighbors. Instead, each of the states has attempted to
craft policies designed to deal with its own peculiar mix of problems and opportuni-
ties. This is not to say that New England state policymakers have ignored policies
adopted in other states — far from it. But information from other states has been
filtered through each state's traditions, culture, and institutional structure before
being adopted, dropped, or modified. Put another way, each state has acted as a
separate political entity, with independent authority, free to shape welfare policies
to meet its own political and economic imperatives.
One way to appreciate the variety of choices made is to examine the content of
state plans filed with the national government as a condition of receiving the new
federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant. Based on in-
formation provided by the American Public Welfare Association in its September
1997 State-by-State Welfare Reform Policy Decisions, Table 1 provides a rank order-
ing of the fifty states according to the relative generosity of their reform policies.
The ranking is based on thirteen common policy options found in state TANF plans. 2
For each policy, states were awarded one point if they chose the more generous
option — for example, not having a TANF time limit shorter than sixty months —
and penalized one point if they chose such more restrictive policy as denying TANF
to legal noncitizens. All options were weighted equally to provide a composite score
for each state that in principle could range from a high of plus 13 to a low of minus
13.
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Table 1
Ranking of State TANF Plans
State
Rhode Island
Maine
Colorado
Vermont
Utah
Texas
Ohio
Oregon
Iowa
South Carolina
Kentucky
Alaska
West Virginia
Washington
Oklahoma
Missouri
Hawaii
Delaware
Arizona
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
New York
New Hampshire
Montana
Michigan
Score
+ 11
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 8
+ 7
+ 7
+ 7
+ 7
+ 6
+ 6
+ 6
+ 5
+ 5
+ 5
+ 5
+ 5
+ 5
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 3
+ 3
+ 3
+ 3
State Score
Kansas + 3
Indiana + 3
Arkansas + 3
North Carolina ~2
Nebraska + 2
Georgia + 2
Tennessee + 1
New Mexico + 1
Nevada + 1
Mississippi + 1
Minnesota + 1
Virginia + 1
Connecticut + 1
Alabama + 1
Wisconsin
Maryland
Wyoming -1
Virginia -1
South Dakota -1
Idaho -1
Florida -1
North Dakota -2
California -2
Illinois -3
Massachusetts -5
Source: American Public Welfare Association, State-by-State Welfare Reform
Policy Decisions, September 1997, processed.
The range of policy choices revealed in Table 1 underscores the difficulty of
generalizing about state welfare reform decisions. Some states have preserved gen-
erous policies, the majority have balanced liberal and restrictive provisions, and
about one fifth of the states have chosen to adopt more restrictive eligibility require-
ments. Clearly, states have not followed any single pattern. Instead, as the American
Public Welfare Association itself concludes, the "underlying theme that emerges . . .
is that states are taking a wide variety of approaches . . . [and] the mix of assistance
and services for [TANF] families is quite diverse." 3
Nowhere is that diversity more pronounced than in New England. As Table 1
reveals, New England state welfare reform plans range from the most generous —
Rhode Island — to the most restrictive — Massachusetts — policies in the country,
affirming our earlier observation about the independence of state actions. Even
among the remaining four states, there is considerable variation in the types of poli-
cies chosen. In only two issue areas, providing TANF to legal noncitizens and refus-
ing to drug-test applicants, did all six states report taking the same action. Like the
nation as a whole, the region includes states that represent the entire spectrum of
possible policy choices: generous — Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont; moderate —
New Hampshire; and restrictive — Connecticut and Massachusetts.
These outcomes demonstrate that states choose quite different policies, even in
instances where they border one another. This point is particularly important in New
England, where migration to one of many states is facilitated by their proximity.
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Indeed, considering that generous Rhode Island is sandwiched between restrictive
Massachusetts on the east and restrictive Connecticut on the west, the difference in
scores for these neighboring states is instructive. Clearly, decision makers in each
state formulated their own policy goals, regardless of what their neighbors were
doing.
The sheer variety of policies adopted by states across the country as well as in
New England is an important discovery, since it casts doubt on theories which sug-
gest that states would race to undercut each other when setting benefits. The hypoth-
esis that under devolution "all states will be engaged in a race for the bottom, each
state trying to shift the cost of welfare to its neighbors" has not happened in New
England. 4 This point is emphasized even more when the timing as well as the quality
of state plans is considered. The order in which state reform plans were enacted was
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island. As
Table 1 illustrates, these states scored +8, -5, +1, +3, +10, and +11, respectively, in
the ranking, which indicates that there is no relationship between the date of submis-
sion of a state plan and the generosity of its provisions. To the extent that there is
any pattern, it is one of increasing generosity over time. Maine and Rhode Island,
the two most generous states in the country, submitted plans at least one month after
other states had made their intentions known. The most telling example is Rhode
Island, which adopted its policies a full two years after Massachusetts experimented
with the waiver that would become its state plan.
The data shown in Table 1 make clear that variety, rather than some imagined race
to the bottom, is the dominant characteristic of state policy choice. How can we
explain such diverse policy outcomes?
Explaining Variety: Do Existing Theories Work?
Long before the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act, studies had found substantial differences among state welfare poli-
cies. 5 Even under old AFDC guidelines, states retained limited authority to determine
eligibility requirements and benefit levels. Scholars have used several variables to
explain policy variation, including state fiscal condition, tax capacity, population
demographics, partisanship, and legislative professionalism. 6 Though there are dif-
ferences among these studies, the general principle is straightforward: increases in
the values of these variables lead to increases in welfare generosity. For example,
states with favorable economic conditions, higher tax capacities, and more wealthy
populations are likely to have more liberal policies. If a state legislature has a higher
percentage of Democrats and a greater degree of professionalism, its policies are
likely to be more liberal.
Set against the New England cases, however, these political-economic determi-
nants of policy prove to be poor predictors of Temporary Assistance to Needy Fami-
lies provisions. For example, Massachusetts, with the region's best growth rate, a
high tax capacity, high per capita income, Democratic control of the legislature, and
high legislative professionalism, should have adopted a generous state plan. Other
examples are less clear cut, but none of the fiscal or political variables typically
used to explain state policies adequately accounts for the direction of welfare poli-
cies in the six states.
Consider the presumptive impact of economic conditions on policy. Data avail-
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able for onc-ycar growth rates beginning the first fiscal quarter of 1996 and ending
the first fiscal quarter of 1997 provide a context for examining the impact of a
state's economy on its welfare policy. This time frame encompasses the period be-
fore states negotiated plans through several months after implementation. We have
combined data on employment, personal income, and population to develop an in-
dex that ranks the states according to the growth of their economies. In Table 2, the
national growth rate is set at zero. Each state's index reflects its performance rela-
tive to the national average.
Massachusetts, which has the highest economic growth rate, has the most restric-
tive policy. Rhode Island and Vermont, both among the most fiscally challenged
states, have adopted generous welfare programs. Despite having less economic mo-
mentum than New Hampshire, Maine has a far more generous plan. Other economic
indicators bolster these findings. Connecticut and Massachusetts have the highest
tax capacities in the region (see Table 3), but the most restrictive plans. Rhode Is-
land and Maine have the lowest tax capacities but the most generous welfare plans.
Table 2
Index of State Momentum, 1996-1997
State Percentage
Massachusetts 0.50
New Hampshire 0.39
United States 0.00
Maine -0.10
Connecticut -0.30
Rhode Island -0.77
Vermont -0.88
Source: State Policy Research, Inc., State Policy Reports, September 1997.
A similar relationship occurs between income levels and state policy choices. In
1996, Connecticut ranked first in the country in per capita income; Massachusetts
ranked third. The three states with the most generous provisions, Rhode Island (18),
Vermont (29), and Maine (36), all had per capita incomes at or below the national
average. 7 Instead of adopting generous plans, high-income states were the most
restrictive. Low-income states were far less willing to choose restrictive policies.
Standard political indicators do no better at explaining welfare policies in the
Table 3
Tax Capacity, Percentage of National Average, 1994
State Percentage
Connecticut 135.7
New Hampshire 113.1
Massachusetts 112.5
United States 100.0
Vermont 95.0
Rhode Island 93.5
Maine 88.7
Source: State Policy Research, Inc., State Policy Reports, January 1998.
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New England states. Partisanship, for example, provides little help. The partisan
composition of the six state legislatures in 1996, when TANF plans were developed,
is reported in Table 4 below. Rhode Island, with the highest percentage of Demo-
crats, 83 percent, adopted the most liberal plan. Yet Massachusetts also had large
Democratic majorities in both houses of its legislature. To complicate matters, both
states had Republican governors. From a partisan perspective, both states were al-
most exactly alike.
Partisan explanations also fail to account for other states within the region. Al-
though New Hampshire had the lowest percentage of Democratic legislators, its state
plan was more generous than those produced in Massachusetts and Connecticut. The
percentage of Republican legislators was higher in Maine and Vermont than in Con-
necticut when TANF plans were formulated, yet these states produced more gener-
ous plans.
Table 4
Partisan Composition of State Legislatures, 1996
Percentage
of
State Democrats Republicans Democrats
Rhode Island 124 26 83
Massachusetts 151 43 78
Connecticut 110 77 59
Vermont 98 79 55
Maine 91 93 49
New Hampshire 116 300 39
Source: Council of State Governments, The Book of the States: 1996-97.
Since four of the six states had Republican governors when TANF plans were
submitted, it is difficult to assess the impact of gubernatorial partisanship. Neverthe-
less it is important to remember that the first state to submit its waiver request, Ver-
mont, was led by a Democratic governor. States that had Republican governors pro-
duced policies which ranged from generous to restrictive, independently of which
party controlled the legislature. This is especially noteworthy in New Hampshire, the
only state that did not have divided control. As one New Hampshire legislator noted, "Our plan
is outstanding, given how conservative New Hampshire is supposed to be."
Finally, legislative professionalism is believed to have a positive impact on the
generosity of state welfare policy. 8 But legislative politics in Maine, Vermont, and
Rhode Island are not as highly professional as in Massachusetts and Connecticut.
Even New Hampshire, with its highly amateur style of politics, produced a plan far
more generous than those of most other states. Contrary to expectations, states with
less professional politics produced more generous plans in the region.
Why Explanations Fail: Models and Methods
The failure of conventional economic and political indicators to illuminate welfare
reform in New England may reflect nothing more than the difficulty of attempting to
derive general conclusions from a very small number of cases. In our view, however,
there is another serious problem, which is the absence of intervening institutions in
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popular explanations of policy outcomes. In using measurements of economic or
political conditions to explain policy, the assumption seems to be that there is a
direct relationship between the measured condition and policy. Public policies, in
this conceptualization, reflect nothing more than the aggregate conditions measured
by numerical indicators. Wealthy people have more money to spend, thus wealthy
states are likely to have more generous welfare plans, and vice versa. If Democrats
are liberal and Republicans conservative, legislatures dominated by Democrats will
produce liberal plans and legislatures dominated by Republicans will produce re-
strictive plans. In this view, understanding policy is little more than an exercise in
demographics.
This representation is something of a caricature, to be sure, but we believe it cap-
tures much of the popular thinking about welfare reform and helps to account for the
popularity of the "race to the bottom" hypothesis. Those who have predicted such a
race typically have believed that all states are dominated by business interests,
which are uniform in their desire for less government spending and lower taxes;
hence all states will be driven to lower their welfare benefits. So long as a uniform
business interest is assumed rather than examined, and so long as the entities re-
ferred to as states remain equally unexamined, this model has an appealing logic.
Business seeks the lowest-cost bottom line and, seeking to accommodate business
interests, states respond by cutting benefits as they race to the bottom. In some un-
specified and unanalyzed way, a uniform business interest is directly translated
into state policy.
Yet if we know anything about public policymaking it is that public policy is
more than the sum of pressures from some group or groups in a given jurisdiction.
Peter Hall has persuasively argued that political pressures are mediated by "an orga-
nizational dynamic that imprints its own image on the outcomes . . . [and] institu-
tions that aggregate the opinions of individual contributors into a set of policies . . .
have their own effects on policy outputs." 9 It is precisely these institutions and
organizational dynamics, of course, that are completely absent from analyses based
on relationships between aggregate data and policy outcomes. To understand wel-
fare reform in New England, therefore, we need to move beyond aggregate relation-
ships to the institutions and dynamics that imprint their images on policy outcomes.
We suggest that an examination of the development of welfare policy in the New
England states reveals patterns waiting to be explained, patterns that are missed
when treating policy as nothing more than the reflections of overall political forces.
The assumptions of existing theories simply do not reflect the realities of the formu-
lation and implementation of welfare policy in New England.
Institutions and Dynamics
For those concerned over the presumptive dominance of business interests in state
policymaking, it will doubtless come as a surprise to learn that the voice of business
has been largely absent from deliberations over welfare reform in New England.
Administrative officials in all the states report that they have not been lobbied by
business interests seeking to influence either welfare policy or its implementation.
As a member of Vermont's Agency of Human Services notes, "We have not really
been contacted by businesses . . . the business community has not applied much
pressure." In Maine, members of that state's advisory group have argued that
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"business groups are not at all involved with negotiations over Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families." In New Hampshire, where business groups historically
have been strong, the role of these groups has been minimal. According to a New
Hampshire lobbyist, "Business groups are not important . . . Policymakers know they
are there, but it's not clear how they fit in."
Even welfare advocates, themselves wary of business power, agree that economic
groups have not been major players in the formulation of waivers and TANF plans.
Advocacy groups in Connecticut and Massachusetts contrasted their own relative
lack of access to the John G. Rowland and William F. Weld administrations with the
close relationships business organizations appeared to have with officials of those
governments. Nevertheless, both state officials and lobbyists noted that business
groups did not seek to influence the process. According to one member of
Connecticut's Department of Social Services, "Business was not very involved in
negotiations." Welfare advocates in Massachusetts also agreed that, if anything,
influence from business came in the form of more general pressure to keep the state
fiscally strong.
Business did play a critical role in shaping welfare reform in Rhode Island, but it
was not the role uninformed observers might have predicted. Early in 1995, the
Rhode Island Public Expenditure Council (RIPEC), a business-financed watchdog
group, joined with the Campaign to Eliminate Childhood Poverty and other commu-
nity groups to explore the options available for reforming welfare in Rhode Island.
This early study group later became a coalition that developed its own plan for wel-
fare reform that ultimately became the basis for both the new state law and the TANF
plan. One of the major objectives of this coalition plan, however, was to prevent a 15
percent reduction in welfare benefits that was proposed by Republican Governor
Lincoln Almond. Led by RIPEC, the coalition was successful in fending off the pro-
posed reduction and, in agreement with Governor Almond, was also successful in
expanding medical care and creating a new child care entitlement for the state's
welfare population. Having played a major role in policymaking, however, RIPEC
has since taken no part in ongoing efforts to implement the new legislation. As
RIPEC's executive director said later, "Once we got the legislation passed, I didn't
feel it was our place to be looking over their shoulders in the implementation pro-
cess."
The general lack of business participation in shaping state welfare policy in New
England, coupled with one business organization's support for higher rather than
lower benefits, suggest the fallibility of untested assumptions about business behav-
ior. Although business control over state welfare policies is often alleged, it remains
unclear why business should even be interested in welfare. Business and welfare
client populations seldom overlap by much, the amount of money spent on welfare
is small relative to other items in state budgets, and other issues such as overall tax
climate are far more salient than welfare to most business leaders. Even when busi-
ness does become involved, the RIPEC example makes clear that business groups
need not uniformly oppose liberal welfare provisions. Business groups differ in size,
they differ in structure, they differ in purpose, and they differ in quality of leader-
ship. Whether or not business is engaged, and to what ends, must therefore be a
matter of investigation, not assumption.
In addition to the general absence of business participation in shaping state wel-
fare policies, there is one other common element that has characterized reform pro-
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cesses in the New England states: the leadership demonstrated by the governors and
their senior welfare administrators. In each of the states except Rhode Island, it was
the governors who initiated reform proposals and senior administrators who have
been primarily responsible for implementation. Even in Rhode Island, where the
governor's plan was in competition with an alternative plan that had been intro-
duced earlier, many of the governor's proposals were incorporated in the compro-
mise proposal that was eventually passed unanimously by the legislature. The gov-
ernor had competition in Rhode Island, but he remained a major player and a major
influence on the new legislation. It is also important to note that implementation of
the new law has been entirely in the hands of the governor's senior staff in the De-
partment of Human Services.
None of this should be taken to mean that state legislatures have been unimpor-
tant. On the contrary, on several occasions in several states, legislatures blocked
welfare reform bills proposed by governors, forcing changes in them. On other occa-
sions, as in Maine, the legislature approved a bill authorizing the Department of
Health and Human Services to put together a waiver request. A small number of
legislators in each state also have participated actively in groups that deliberated
over policy choices and, later, in groups created to monitor implementation. On the
whole, however, legislatures have been reactive, taking action largely in response to
proposals put forward by governors. It is the governors who have led the way in
offering proposals, thus defining the terms over which political debates would oc-
cur.
The Significance of State Administration
Perhaps the most important characteristic of welfare decision making in the New
England states, however, is the comprehensive and powerful role played by state
administrators. In each state, senior administrators helped to shape new welfare
policies, and once new policies had been determined, they assumed principal re-
sponsibility for implementing those policies. Agency officials used their consider-
able discretion in turning policy into action in different ways, notably in the degree
to which they provided access for welfare advocacy and community groups seeking
to influence decisions. Where such access was provided, implementation decisions
were more liberal; where it was not, decisions were more restrictive. This was always
true, independent of the state's political or fiscal condition.
In the four states with the most generous policies, senior administrators acted
imaginatively by creating Welfare Reform Advisory Groups (WRAGs) consisting
primarily of pro-welfare organizations. These groups were organized in states with
various political environments. States with Democratic, Republican, and Indepen-
dent governors had advisory groups, as did states with divided and unified control
in the legislature. In Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island, administrative officials
formed WRAGs prior to the formulation of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
plans and continue to meet with these groups over implementation issues. In New
Hampshire, a WRAG was formally established later, after department officials had
submitted the TANF plan, although informal meetings between officials and groups
were quite common before this time. In Connecticut, the Department of Social Ser-
vices employed a statewide council to solicit input, but officials did not convene a
formal WRAG at any point. Unlike the other states, Massachusetts did not make any
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arrangements for WRAGs and took the unprecedented step of suspending the forty-
five-day comment period on TANF provisions.
Advocates in Rhode Island, Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire all believe that
officials have been receptive to their suggestions and that policies reflected their
preferences. One member of Maine's WRAG commented that "there was a great deal
of working between state [officials] and groups . . . The department saw great value
in engaging groups." A member of Rhode Island's WRAG noted that the state had
achieved "a good law, a fair law," but expressed concern that elected officials would
undermine the terms of reform agreed upon by the Department of Human Services
and advocate groups. One New Hampshire WRAG member voiced a similar prefer-
ence for working with agencies and not elected officials, arguing that "we are far
more comfortable dealing with [administrative] folks. State agencies are long-term-
ers .. . As open as [deliberations] are now, more advocates are invited to the table."
Another member of that group argued that the deliberations with the department
were the most effective way to communicate preferences, since agency officials "are
more friendly than legislators — some of these people have human service training."
In fact, the bulk of New Hampshire's plan was actually written by the director of
Health and Human Services, who is a former member of a prominent low-income
advocacy group.
Administrative officials in these states similarly affirm the value of group input.
As the director of the Rhode Island Department of Human Services remarked, "A lot
of credence is given to advocacy groups . . . We listen a lot to what they have to say."
A member of Vermont's Agency of Human Services agreed that "the contributions of
advocacy groups have made a big difference in shaping welfare policy in this state,"
adding that the coordination of the WRAG with the agency "moved Vermont into a
more supportive stance than if it had just gone with the terms of the federal plan."
In Massachusetts and Connecticut, on the other hand, agencies and advocates
were largely adversaries rather than allies. Officials in these two states provided the
fewest opportunities for welfare supporters to contest policy decisions, and bargain-
ing opportunities did not exist as they did in the states that produced more generous
provisions. Both Connecticut and Massachusetts officials typically relied on formal
channels of influence such as legislative hearings to solicit information. Not surpris-
ingly, advocates in these states were frustrated by the refusal of officials to work
more closely with them to develop policy. One Connecticut lobbyist characterized
the Department of Social Services as an adversary, adding that "the contributions of
advocacy groups are not taken as significant." Even a senior official of the depart-
ment admitted that pro-welfare groups "did not have ready access to the depart-
ment." Massachusetts advocates were also concerned about their declining influence
on state officials. One group leader said that, in contrast to previous administrations,
"members of state agencies are now unfriendly . . . The types of people in charge
now are not public service types." These kinds of comments, typical in Massachu-
setts and Connecticut, were a far cry from the relatively warm characterizations of
administrative officials expressed by advocates in the other New England states.
Whether they supported liberal or restrictive welfare policies, then, administra-
tors in the New England states were critical actors in defining state policies and in
deciding how to implement them. This should not be surprising, given the literature
on public bureaucracies, which has repeatedly shown that administrators typically
formulate plans, mobilize constituencies, provide access to favored groups, and
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advocate for policies that can benefit them and the populations they serve. 10 What is
surprising is the relative lack of attention paid to the role of state administrators in
the many speculative discussions about the consequences of welfare devolution.
Focusing attention on administrative actions allows us not only to develop a better
understanding of the sources of policy variety but also to observe emerging patterns
of policymaking that may have lasting significance.
Consider, for example, the Rhode Island WRAG, probably the most innovative
and most fully developed of the New England advisory groups. Technically called
the Implementation Subcommittee of the Task Force on Federal Legislation of the
state Children's Cabinet, this group was initiated by Christine Ferguson, director of
the Department of Human Services, at the request of several community groups.
Membership is essentially open-ended and includes any community group, advo-
cacy group, and service provider organization that chooses to attend, as well as
senior administrators from the department and any other interested parties, such as
lobbyists or former legislators. The open-ended nature of membership means that
the semiweekly meetings can be very large, sometimes attended by more than sev-
enty persons, depending on the topics under discussion. It is difficult to imagine a
more effective vehicle for generating the broadest possible range of opinions from
community organizations, including those which had successfully opposed the re-
form plan developed by the department and put forward by the governor.
In a memorandum creating the subcommittee, the Department of Human Services
(DHS) gives it extraordinarily broad responsibilities: "The committee . . . can serve
as a community sounding board and planning body to assist DHS as it implements
the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act (PRA) and the state
Family Independence Act. // would also address broader children and family issues.
As needed, smaller work groups would break off to do more intensive, time-sensi-
tive work on specific issues" (italics added). The subcommittee began meeting in the
fall of 1996 and has been meeting every other week for two hours ever since. DHS
senior staff attend every meeting and provide information and staff assistance to the
subcommittee and the several task forces it has created to address separate issues. In
keeping with its mandate, the subcommittee has addressed a broad range of issues
from intake procedures and client assessment to substance abuse and domestic vio-
lence. It has also prepared a detailed set of recommendations following its review of
the new program design being implemented by DHS. Most recently it has been re-
viewing the plan developed by the Department of Labor and Training, in conjunc-
tion with DHS, to administer the new Welfare to Work funds.
As this brief review suggests, Rhode Island's new Implementation Subcommittee
has become a forum for an ongoing public dialogue between DHS and the state's
welfare community over many policy issues, large and small. After three years of
meetings, regular participants are on a first-name basis, a degree of trust has re-
placed mutual suspicion, and both DHS and subcommittee members agree that the
subcommittee's work has been helpful in shaping policy. The subcommittee is nei-
ther an administrative arm of DHS nor a coalition of community groups but a little of
both. Fundamentally it is a forum in which community representatives are brought
directly into the decision-making process and senior DHS administrators get imme-
diate feedback, positive and negative, about their decisions, even as they are making
them. Although administrators sometimes are uncomfortable with the immediacy of
criticism, and while group representatives sometimes feel uneasy over straddling the
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line between influence and co-option, both sides continue to work energetically on
the complexities of reforming welfare. For the moment this new instrumentality
appears to be working. Whether it will ultimately be abandoned as a failed experi-
ment or modified or made permanent remains to be seen.
Conclusions
Welfare reform in New England has confounded those who have based their expec-
tations on unexamined assumptions about the structure and dynamics of federal-
state relations. Within this region, at least, there is no evidence of any race to the
bottom, with states competing against one another to achieve the lowest benefit
levels. Business groups have not led such a race; indeed, business groups have had
little or nothing to say about reforming welfare. Nor have governors or state legisla-
tures engaged in such a race. Furthermore, neither gubernatorial proposals nor legis-
lative responses have been based on the actions of neighboring states. Instead, states
have crafted their own policies to deal with their own welfare problems, which ac-
counts for the variety in those programs. The results are that three states have en-
acted reforms that rank among the most generous in the nation, another state has
enacted reforms that are average in generosity, and two states have enacted less
generous policies; Massachusetts, whose reforms are the most restrictive in the na-
tion, is one of the two.
Conventional analysis that attempts to associate various indicators of political or
economic conditions with policy is of little help in understanding these outcomes.
Conventional analysis pays little attention to the institutional systems through which
policies are developed and thus misses the most important source of welfare policies
in New England: the actions of state administrators. Four states have relatively lib-
eral policies because administrators in those states sought out members of commu-
nity and advocacy groups, listened to them, crafted policies based on what they
heard, and invited such groups to help implement the policies. Two states enacted
relatively restrictive policies because administrators, following the lead of their
governors, kept community and advocacy groups at arm's length and paid little
attention to their recommendations. We cannot yet say whether the more liberal
policies will work better than the more restrictive policies to move welfare recipi-
ents into jobs, but we can at least appreciate how those policies came into existence.
Administration matters.
We note in closing that the New England experience challenges the analytically
popular notion that welfare constituencies and the groups that represent them lack
the ability to contest state policies effectively. In four New England states, after all,
welfare advocacy groups were able to exert considerable influence, largely because
of the actions of state officials. Institutional contexts, in short, determine the groups
that will or will not succeed in being influential, and thus which policies are enacted.
Because state capitals are often small in size, with large numbers of advocacy
groups that have relatively easy access to both legislators and administrators, such
groups may in fact have greater opportunities for influence in states than they have
in Washington, where arguments are often drowned out by expensive media cam-
paigns. As Howard Leichter has argued, "In the states, special interests must com-
pete with various citizen groups . . . [This] represents an important strategic im-
provement over the role [low-income] groups now play in the national arena." 11
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Analyses thai ignore state institutional settings, and the actions of administrators
within such settings, will continue to miss much that is critical to our efforts to re-
form welfare. **
We thank our fellow panelists at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the New England Political
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